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Mining and the
Protection of
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David Orentlicher
Pharmaceutical companies have long relied ondirect marketing of their drugs to physiciansthrough one-on-one meetings with sales rep-
resentatives. This practice of "detailing" is substantial
in its costs and its number of participants. Every year,
pharmaceutical companies spend billions of dollars
on millions of visits to physicians by tens of thousands
of sales representatives.,
Critics have argued that drug detailing results in
sub-optimal prescribing decisions by physicians, com-
promising patient health and driving up spending on
medical care. In this view, physicians often are unduly
influenced both by marketing presentations that do
not accurately reflect evidence from the medical liter-
ature and by the gifts that sales representatives deliver
in conjunction with their presentations.
Accordingly, public officials, professional societies
and physicians have called for stricter regulation of
the physician-sales representative relationship. Pro-
fessional guidelines often include limits on gifts,2 and
medical schools may restrict contacts between sales
representatives and physicians.3
This article considers the legislative efforts by states
to address a long-standing, but increasingly refined
practice that pharmaceutical companies use to enhance
their drug-detailing efforts.4 Health care information
organizations employ computer technology to collect
and analyze data from prescriptions as they are filled
at pharmacies. The organizations sell their analyses,
which can include general prescribing trends as well
as physician-specific data, to pharmaceutical compa-
nies so the companies' sales representatives can better
target their marketing activities. This "data mining"
has provoked concern because it can not only exacer-
bate the effects of drug detailing but also compromise
other interests of patients.
In response, a few state legislatures have passed laws
to prohibit or limit the use of data mining for market-
ing purposes.6 In turn, the laws have been challenged
by the information organizations as violating their
first amendment right to freedom of speech.
This article considers the policy arguments regard-
ing legislative regulation of data mining. It also evalu-
ates the constitutional implications of the regulations
and concludes that the state provisions are desirable
and should withstand constitutional challenge.
Data Mining
Given the high costs of their detailing efforts, drug
companies are eager to employ the most efficient ways
David Orentlicher, M.D., J.D., is the Samuel R. Rosen Pro-
fessor ofLaw and Co-Director, Centerfor Law and Health, at
the Indiana University School ofLaw-Indianapolis.
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS74
David Orentlicher
to identify physicians who might be persuaded to pre-
scribe their drugs.
Consider the example of a pharmaceutical company
launching a new calcium channel blocker to treat
hypertension. Any internist could prescribe the drug
to patients, but drug companies prefer knowing which
internists prescribe anti-hypertensive drugs for a lot
of patients, and which of those internists favor exist-
ing calcium channel blockers. Companies also like to
know which physicians are quick to prescribe new
drugs ("early adopters").6
For their existing drugs, companies like to know
which physicians are already prescribing the drugs,
so they can reinforce the physicians' preferences. In
addition, companies like to know when a physician
switches from the company's drug to a competing
drug, so the company can encourage the physician to
switch back.7
Given the high costs of their detailing efi
drug companies are eager to employ the
efficient ways to identify physicians who
be persuaded to prescribe their drugs.
Drug companies can find all of this information by
paying data miners who assemble information from
individual prescriptions filled by pharmacies. When a
prescription is filled, the data miners collect the name
of the drug, the dose and quantity of the drug, the date
of the prescription, and the physician's name.9 While
the patient's name is not retrieved, the data miner does
assign a unique number to the patient so that future
prescriptions for the patient can be analyzed together.o
Thus, for example, the data miner can determine how
long the patient remains on the drug, whether the
physician substitutes a new drug or simply discontin-
ues drug therapy, and which new drugs are prescribed
for the patient. To ensure that they match each pre-
scription to the correct physician and to increase their
information about the prescribing physician, the data
miners obtain data from other sources, particularly
the American Medical Association (AMA)'s "Physi-
cian Masterfile," a database that includes all U.S. phy-
sicians, whether or not they belong to the AMA."
In addition to figuring out which doctors should be
the focus of their detailing efforts, sales representa-
tives can use data mining to tailor their presentations.
If a physician already is using a competing drug, the
representative can highlight ways in which the repre-
sentative's drug is superior to the competing drug.12
Opposition to Data Mining
Data mining is not condemned entirely. Researchers
trying to understand the effects of marketing activities
and other influences on physicians' prescribing deci-
sions can learn a great deal from the data mining com-
panies.13 Thus, even while New Hampshire prohibits
data mining when used to promote prescription drug
sales, it permits data mining when used to inform
health care research.14
Data Mining Can Exacerbate the
Problems with Drug Detailing
Critics have objected to data mining when used to
enhance drug detailing because of the potential for
harm to patients. When sales representatives meet
with a physician, they tout the advantages
of their drugs without trying to present a
balanced assessment of the place for their
'orts, products among a physician's options
most for treatment. 5 As a result, physicians
may develop an overly enthusiastic view
might of a drug's value and prescribe it when
another drug or no drug would be more
appropriate for the patient. If physicians
prescribe the wrong drug, patient health
may suffer.
This is problematic not only for the patient's well-
being but also for society's health care spending -
inadequate treatment may result in the need for costly,
in-patient treatment at a hospital. Health care costs
may be increased unnecessarily even if there is no det-
riment to patient health. A physician might be influ-
enced to prescribe an expensive drug when an equally
effective but lower cost alternative is available.
Because of these concerns, critics have argued, phy-
sicians should simply refuse to meet with sales repre-
sentatives from pharmaceutical companies.16 Rather,
when physicians need information about prescription
drugs, they should be consulting objective and unbi-
ased evaluations written by medical specialists.
But does drug detailing really influence prescribing
decisions by physicians? Perhaps, as some argue, phy-
sicians base their decisions strictly on medical consid-
erations and are not swayed by promotional pitches.
In that regard, physicians tend to report a healthy
dose of skepticism when surveyed about their attitudes
toward drug company marketing. They are more likely
to report negative rather than positive views about the
accuracy and value of information from sales repre-
sentatives.17 Still, some studies have found neutral
attitudes by physicians toward sales representatives,
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with the physicians reporting that the representatives
provide useful information."'
While physicians may report a resistance to pro-
motional efforts, evidence from physicians' actual
practices indicates that drug detailing does influ-
ence prescribing decisions. Not only do visits from
sales representatives increase drug sales, but they do
so more than advertisements directed to physicians
in professional journals or advertisements directed
to consumers on television or in other media. Drug
detailing also increases the likelihood that a physi-
cian will request the addition of a drug to a hospital's
formulary.20
More importantly, the influence on physician pre-
scribing can compromise clinical decision-making.
Researchers have found that the quality of prescrib-
ing decisions increases the more physicians rely on
independent sources of information and decreases the
more physicians rely on information from sales repre-
sentatives.21 After interactions with sales representa-
tives, for example, physicians are more likely to pre-
scribe expensive, new drugs instead of cheaper generic
drugs, even when there is no medical advantage to the
newer drug.22 In one important study, researchers sur-
veyed physicians' attitudes about two commonly pre-
scribed drugs for which empirical studies found little
benefit but promotional materials suggested substan-
tially more benefit. While the physicians claimed to
be influenced by the medical data, their attitudes in
fact often were more consistent with the promotional
claims.23 Not only were the physicians making inap-
propriate prescribing decisions, they were unaware
that they were doing so. This lack of awareness likely
is being exploited by pharmaceutical companies for
other drugs. Studies of promotional brochures and
presentations by sales representative find selective
or even inaccurate reporting of data that can mislead
physicians into overestimating the efficacy and under-
estimating the side effects of the drugs being mar-
keted.24 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regularly cites pharmaceutical companies for promo-
tional materials that exaggerate the benefits and/or
minimize the risks of prescription drugs.25
It may be that drug detailing alone does not influ-
ence physician prescribing decisions. Rather, sales rep-
resentatives may exert their influence through a com-
bination of promotional information and the giving
of gifts. When physicians receive a gift, they may feel
the normal and important social obligation to recipro-
cate, and they may do so by prescribing the promoted
drugs.26 Indeed, in a study that involved the audio-
taping of detailing visits from sales representatives,
researchers reported that acts of reciprocation were
the most commonly observed way in which physicians
were influenced in their prescribing practices.27
Data Mining Unfairly Exploits Patient-Physician
and Patient-Pharmacist Relationships
If data mining is problematic because it intensifies the
problems created by drug detailing, why not regulate
drug detailing directly? There are two important rea-
sons that can explain why the legislative efforts have
focused on data mining.
First, pharmaceutical companies manufacture legal
- indeed socially important - products, and they are
entitled to cultivate potential customers of those prod-
ucts. The Supreme Court has recognized this interest
through a first amendment right for businesses to
advertise and solicit clients for their goods and ser-
vices (the "commercial speech" doctrine). If market-
ing activities have harmful effects, first amendment
principle instructs society to counter the harmful
effects with counter-speech, not by prohibiting phar-
maceutical companies from promoting their drugs.28
Indeed, some medical schools and health care orga-
nizations have done exactly that. By using "academic
detailing'" universities, professional societies and oth-
ers can encourage physicians to base their prescrib-
ing on medical evidence rather than drug company
promotions.29
Legislative efforts have focused on data mining also
because data mining directly invades the interests
of patients in a way that drug detailing does not. In
particular, it involves an expropriation of informa-
tion created in the privacy of patient-physician and
patient-pharmacist relationships.o
Confidentiality Interests ofPatients
Information about a patient's health is highly sensi-
tive. It can cause embarrassment and result in stigma-
tization and discrimination. Consider in this regard
the implications when family, friends, acquaintances,
or employers find out that a person has a drug abuse
problem, a sexually-transmitted disease, a mental ill-
ness, or a cancer. While a prescription may provide
only indirect evidence of a patient's health, it can pro-
vide fairly clear evidence of illness. If a patient fills
prescriptions for efavirenz (Sustiva) and tenofovir/
emtricitabine (Truvada), people can readily conclude
that the patient is being treated for an HIV infection.31
If a patient fills a prescription for olanzapine (Zyprexa),
others can reasonably suspect that the patient is being
treated for mental illness.32
Physicians, pharmacists and other health care profes-
sionals therefore promise strict rules of confidentiality.
Indeed, the duty to protect patient confidentiality has
been a hallmark of medical codes of ethics throughout
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While concerns about patient confidentiality have been voiced about data
mining, data mining companies strip their records of information that can
identify patients and indeed are required to do so by HIPAA.
history." Moreover, the government reinforces ethi-
cal principles of confidentiality with legal safeguards,
including the Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and state law provisions.3 4
While concerns about patient confidentiality have
been voiced about data mining,"' data mining com-
panies strip their records of information that can
identify patients and indeed are required to do so by
HIPAA.36
Advocates of data mining laws have invoked the pri-
vacy interests of physicians, but identifying the pre-
scribing practices of physicians does not entail disclo-
sure of the kind of sensitive information that privacy
safeguards are designed to protect. Accordingly, even
when a federal court of appeals upheld New Hamp-
shire's data mining law, it did not invoke the privacy
concerns of physicians in doing so.' 7
Property Interests ofPatients
As the entire data mining enterprise reflects, informa-
tion can have substantial economic value. Data min-
ing companies pay pharmacies for the right to extract
information about prescriptions, and pharmaceutical
companies pay the mining companies for information
about individual physicians' prescribing practices.
This use of prescription information for economic
purposes has troubling implications for patients. In
effect, data mining companies exploit the relationships
between patients and their physicians or pharmacists
for the pecuniary benefit of pharmacies, pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers, and the mining companies them-
selves. To be sure, the practice of medicine regularly
entails the realization of profit by pharmacies and
pharmaceutical manufacturers, as well as physicians
and hospitals. But ethical principle justifies the ability
of health care providers and companies to profit from
patient care because economic incentives are neces-
sary to ensure high quality care. Capable people will
not pursue the practice of medicine or pharmacy if
they are not compensated for doing so, and industry
will not develop new therapies if they are not compen-
sated for doing so.
It is difficult, however, to justify the mining of pre-
scription data in terms of the interests of patients. As
discussed above, drug detailing encourages physicians
to prescribe a drug even when scientific evidence indi-
cates that the prescription is not desirable. Patients
may receive a drug when one is not needed, they may
receive a drug that is less effective or that has greater
side effects than an alternative, or they may receive a
drug that is more expensive than an equally effective
alternative.
And while drug detailing poses risks to patient
welfare, it does not offer offsetting benefits. Argu-
ably, patients might benefit when a sales representa-
tive apprises a physician of a therapeutic alternative
of which the physician was unaware.38 Obtaining
information can be costly in terms of time or finan-
cial expense, and sales representatives may overcome
the cost barriers to physicians educating themselves
about pharmaceutical options. However, it is very easy
for physicians to obtain timely and accurate informa-
tion about new (and existing) drugs without listening
to sales representatives. For $98 a year, for example,
physicians can subscribe to The Medical Letter on
Drugs and Therapeutics, a respected and indepen-
dent, biweekly newsletter that provides evaluations
of prescription (and over-the-counter) drugs.39 And
Internet searches or medical information programs
for personal digital assistants (PDAs) make it much
easier today for a physician to find useful and trust-
worthy information on drugs.
Professional Response to Data Mining
All of these considerations suggest that as an ethical
matter, physicians should eliminate the incentive for
data mining by refusing to meet with drug company
sales representatives.0 Medical schools do not permit
sales representatives to participate in the instruction
of students; physicians also should not turn to sales
representatives for their post-graduate education.
Even if they continue to meet with sales represen-
tatives, physicians can prevent the representatives
from using information about their prescribing prac-
tices from the data mining companies. The American
Medical Association established the Physician Data
Restriction Program in May 2006, and any physician
can opt out of data mining by registering with the
Program.4 ' For registered physicians, pharmaceuti-
cal companies still have access to prescriber data for
marketing and research purposes and also for making
compensation decisions for their employees. However,
the companies agree to withhold individual prescriber
information from their sales representatives.42
Pharmacy companies also should take steps to
prevent prescription information from being used
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to enhance drug detailing. To comply with state and
federal privacy laws, pharmacies require patient-
identifiable information to be stripped from prescrip-
tion records before the records are retrieved by health
information organizations.43 The pharmacies also
should require physician-identifiable information to
be stripped.
Legal Response to Data Mining
While professional self-regulation can increase adher-
ence to ethical norms, legal mandates often are nec-
essary to ensure that professionals meet their moral
obligations.44 Accordingly, it is important to consider
the role of legislative action to regulate data mining.
The empirical evidence suggests that legislation may
be needed to prevent the use of prescription informa-
tion for drug detailing activities. Through April 2009,
the AMA's Physician Data Restriction Program had
enrolled 22,000 of roughly 650,000 actively prescrib-
ing behavior" of a physician.4 However, there are two
important exceptions to the restriction. If the infor-
mation is "de-identified" with respect to the physician
(and patient), it can be used when aggregated by zip
code, geographic region, or medical specialty.5o Thus,
a data mining company can analyze the overall pre-
scribing of a calcium channel blocker by internists in
a particular zip code, but the company cannot analyze
the prescribing of a calcium channel blocker by a par-
ticular internist.1 In addition, prescription informa-
tion can be used for purposes more directly connected
to the patient's care or to public welfare. For example,
permissible uses include pharmacy reimbursement,
care management, utilization review, or health care
research.52
Maine and Vermont also have adopted statutes lim-
iting the efforts of data miners. In Vermont, the min-
ers must obtain the consent of the prescribing physi-
cian before using "prescriber-identifiable" information
Even if the sale of information constitutes commercial speech, government may
be able to regulate the sale if it can satisfy the Supreme Court's Central Hudson
test. Under Central Hudson, a regulation of commercial speech is permissible
if it (1) supports a substantial government interest, (2) directly advances that
interest, and (3) is no more extensive than necessary to serve the interest.
ing physicians, or less than 4 percent of those who
can enroll.45 According to Dr. Robert Musacchio, who
oversees the Program, the AMA has strongly pro-
moted the opt-out option, but few physicians have
demonstrated interest.46 This supports the view of the
courts that physician privacy is not a serious concern
with data mining.4 However, it also may reflect the
fact that physicians tend not to appreciate the extent
to which they are influenced by the promotional activ-
ities of sales representatives.4" In any event, while it
makes sense to rely on physicians to protect their own
privacy interests, they should not have sole authority
for protecting the privacy interests of patients.
LegislativeApproaches
In response to the concerns with the mining of pre-
scription records, three states have enacted statutes
that prevent the mining. New Hampshire passed the
first such law with its Prescription Confidentiality Act
of 2006. According to the Act, prescription informa-
tion cannot be used or sold for "advertising, marketing,
promotion," or other activities that involve efforts by
drug companies to "influence or evaluate the prescrib-
from prescription records for marketing or promoting
a drug.53 In Maine, physicians can register with the
state to prevent companies from using prescriber-
identifiable information for marketing or promoting a
drug.64 Thus, Vermont requires a physician to "opt in"
to data mining activity, while Maine requires a physi-
cian to "opt out."
In listing the purposes of its statute, the Maine
State Legislature expressed its concern about patient
confidentiality and physician privacy. The legislators
also stated their desire to promote the state's compel-
ling interests in containing health care spending, by
encouraging the substitution of generic and thera-
peutically equivalent alternatives for more expensive
brand name drugs, and in improving the public's
health.55 The legislative history for the New Hampshire
and Vermont statutes includes the same concerns.56
Judicial Response
The leading data mining companies launched legal
challenges in federal court to the legislation in Maine,
New Hampshire, and Vermont, and were joined in
their challenge to the Vermont law by the Pharmaceu-
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tical Research and Manufacturers of America. While
the companies scored initial successes in the Maine
and New Hampshire district courts,5 7 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit rebuffed their claims in
upholding the New Hampshire statute.8 The district
court in Vermont followed the lead of the First Circuit
in backing Vermont's data mining provisions.59
In their responses to data mining legislation, the
federal courts waded into an important and unsettled
area of law - how to resolve the conflict between
the public's desire for informational privacy and the
first amendment's freedom to speak. On one hand,
people may be dismayed to discover that informa-
tion about their prescriptions is being packaged and
sold by data mining companies for commercial pur-
poses. On the other hand, first amendment advocates
worry when government tries to block the free flow of
information.6o
In sorting out this issue, an important first step
is to decide whether the sale of information from a
database even constitutes "speech" for purposes of the
first amendment. According to all three of the district
courts, the states were restricting speech because they
were interfering with the transfer of information from
data mining companies to pharmaceutical compa-
nies - the data mining companies could not speak
freely to the pharmaceutical companies.1 Moreover,
by blocking the information transfer, the states were
interfering with the ability of pharmaceutical sales
representatives to speak with physicians.62 The dis-
trict courts therefore analyzed the state statutes under
the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine.63 In
the view of the court of appeals, on the other hand,
the sale of prescription information is principally
commercial conduct, just as is the sale of beef jerky,
and the first amendment does not protect commer-
cial conduct from regulation. 64 In this view, providing
first amendment protection for commercial conduct
merely because a business is selling words rather than
other products would entail the resurrection of eco-
nomic substantive due process. 65 The court of appeals
recognized that there is an element of speech in the
sale of information, but concluded that there is "scant
societal value" to the use of prescriber-identifiable
data in drug detailing.66
Even if the sale of information constitutes com-
mercial speech, government may regulate the sale if it
can satisfy the Supreme Court's Central Hudson test.
Under Central Hudson, a regulation of commercial
speech is permissible if it (1) supports a substantial
government interest, (2) directly advances that inter-
est, and (3) is no more extensive than necessary to
serve the interest.67 The Maine and New Hampshire
district courts concluded that the data mining legisla-
tion failed to satisfy the second and third requirements
of the Central Hudson test.68 While the appeals court
did not need to reach the Central Hudson test since it
held that data mining does not involve speech, it did
supply an alternative basis for its holding by deciding
that the legislation constituted a permissible regula-
tion of commercial speech.6 9 In particular, wrote the
court of appeals, the New Hampshire law served the
important state interest of cost containment: drug
detailing armed with data mining encourages physi-
cians to prescribe costly brand-name drugs instead
of less expensive but equally effective generic drugs.7o
The Vermont district court agreed with the First Cir-
cuit in concluding that data mining legislation serves
the state's interest in cost containment.1 The court
also concluded that the regulation serves the state's
interest in protecting the public's health by limiting
the overuse of new drugs like Vioxx with their poten-
tially serious side effects.72
That the different courts came to different con-
clusions on the application of Central Hudson is
not surprising. The Supreme Court has sometimes
implemented the Central Hudson test rigorously
and sometimes more flexibly.73 Similarly, the Maine
and New Hampshire district courts applied Central
Hudson rigorously to strike down the New Hamp-
shire and Maine laws, and the First Circuit and Ver-
mont district court applied the Central Hudson test
more flexibly to uphold the New Hampshire and Ver-
mont laws. As mentioned, the second prong of Cen-
tral Hudson requires a direct connection between the
state's regulation and the substantial interest that the
regulation is designed to serve. The New Hampshire
and Maine district courts did not believe there was a
strong enough empirical link between drug detailing
and harm to patients,4 while the First Circuit and the
Vermont district court found the empirical evidence
sufficient.76 Under the third prong of Central Hudson,
the state regulation must limit speech no more than
necessary to serve the state's interests. The Maine
and New Hampshire district courts felt that alterna-
tive approaches, like restrictions on gifts from drug
companies to physicians, were available to serve the
state's interests without restricting speech,76 while the
First Circuit considered alternative approaches either
inadequate or infeasible.77 The Vermont district court
observed that the Vermont statute was a targeted
response to the problem because it simply allowed
physicians the opportunity to opt out of detailing
based on data mining without interfering in any other
way with the sales efforts of drug companies.8
Does judicial precedent better support either the
Maine and New Hampshire district courts or the
First Circuit and Vermont district court? In all of the
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Supreme Court's cases in which it has recognized first
amendment protection for commercial speech, the
regulations involved restrictions on advertising or
other kinds of solicitation.79 In other words, the Court
has invoked the first amendment to protect the ability
of businesses to speak to potential customers. In none
of the cases did the Court interfere with government
regulation of transactions between two businesses.o
While helpful, Supreme Court doctrine does not set-
tle the matter. If one agrees with the court of appeals
and views the sale of information by one business to
another business as a commercial transaction, then the
data mining statutes should not raise first amendment
concerns. On the other hand, if one agrees with the
district courts and views the state statutes as interfer-
ing with the ability of a business to speak to potential
customers, then the statutes constitute commercial
speech and must satisfy the Court's Central Hudson
test for permissible commercial speech.
Lower court decisions on related issues send a mixed
message as well. On one hand, courts have recog-
nized that the Food and Drug Administration should
be able to regulate the promotion of "off-label" uses
of approved drugs, even though independent physi-
cians are free to encourage off-label use, and all physi-
cians are free to prescribe approved drugs of off-label
uses." Restrictions on the discussion of off-label uses
involve a far greater intrusion on speech than restric-
tions on the transfer of prescription information. On
the other hand, the Tenth Circuit struck down a fed-
eral restriction on the use of customer information by
telecommunications companies.82 The D.C. Circuit
also concluded that a telecommunication company's
use of customer information constitutes commercial
speech, even though that court upheld a regulation of
customer information as a permissible regulation of
commercial speech.><
FirstAmendment Principle and
Regulation ofData Mining
If the case law is indeterminate, we may be able to
sort things out better by considering first amendment
principles. From that perspective, data mining legisla-
tion should be upheld.
To be sure, the arguments for first amendment pro-
tection are significant. As the Maine and New Hamp-
shire district courts observed, the data mining provi-
sions interfere with speech between the data mining
companies and potential customers. Just as newspapers
sell information to readers, data miners sell prescriber
information to pharmaceutical companies. Moreover,
restrictions on data mining are essentially indirect
efforts to regulate the speech of sales representatives
engaged in drug detailing. States that regulate data
mining are driven by concerns that drug detailing can
result in inappropriate prescribing, which in turn can
cause harm to patient health and increases in health
care costs. But if states cannot modify the message of
sales representatives directly because doing so would
infringe the first amendment rights of drug companies
to speak to potential customers, why should they be
able to regulate drug detailing indirectly?84
But there are real problems with the analogy
between a data mining company and a newspaper
in terms of their role in informing the public and in
terms of the kind of information they provide. When
government regulates a newspaper, we rightly worry
whether the government is trying to suppress a disfa-
vored viewpoint. When government regulates a data
mining company, on the other hand, we can be more
confident that the government is trying to protect the
public from misleading promotional messages or from
paying too much for their medical treatment. 5
And even if limits on data mining indirectly affect
the speech of sales representatives, the limits do not
raise the kinds of concerns that drive much of first
amendment law. The states do not restrict what the
sales representatives can say, nor do they require the
sales representatives to make any specific disclosures.
Sales representatives in Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont can make the same presentations to physi-
cians that they make in any other state. Moreover, they
can deliver their presentations to any physician who
will meet with them, just as they can do so in the rest
of the country.
In contrast, when the Supreme Court has struck
down a regulation of pharmaceutical promotion,
it has been concerned about a broad restriction of
speech. Consider in this regard the Court's decision in
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center.8 6 In that
case, the Court rejected a limitation on the advertising
of drug compounding by pharmacies3 ? Pharmacies
could advertise the fact that they provided compound-
ing services, but they could not "'advertise or promote
the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug,
or type of drug."'"' The provision entailed a broad ban
on speech, in contrast to the data mining provisions'
lack of interference with what sales representatives
can say to physicians.
The data mining laws do make it more difficult for
sales representatives to predict where their efforts will
yield the most impact. Without the data mining, the
representatives will not know which physicians write
the most prescriptions for calcium channel blockers,
anti-depressants or anti-histamine drugs.89 As the
First Circuit observed, however, what is at stake is not
whether people can speak but on whether they can
turn a profit.90
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The district court in New Hampshire cited another
important strand of first amendment principle. If the
government is troubled by the effects of speech, its
remedy generally is to rely on counter-speech, not the
suppression of speech.9' In this view, states concerned
about the effects of speech by drug company sales rep-
resentatives should counter the speech rather than try
to block it. States can encourage physicians to regis-
ter with the AMA's Physician Data Restriction Pro-
gram, or they can fund physician-education programs
that provide accurate information about prescription
drugs. In fact, several states, including Maine and
Vermont, do just that.92 However, as the First Circuit
wrote, states do not have the funds to meaningfully
counter the speech of pharmaceutical companies.9 3 As
mentioned, drug companies spend billions of dollars
each year on their detailing efforts9.
Moreover, when the government is speaking itself or
funding the speech of private citizens, it enjoys greater
freedom to regulate the content of speech. Thus, for
example, the federal government can prevent physi-
cians from discussing abortion at clinics that receive
federal funding;95 the government also can consider
the extent to which art funded by federal grants
reflects the "diverse beliefs and values of the American
public''96 While the analogy is not perfect since gov-
ernment does not directly fund pharmaceutical com-
pany marketing efforts, a key justification for regulat-
ing data mining lies in the impact of drug detailing on
the public fisc. If inappropriate prescribing decisions
drive up health care costs, state Medicaid programs
will find it increasingly difficult to fund the needs of
program beneficiaries. States may be limited in their
ability to regulate drug detailing when only private
dollars are at stake, but the analysis should change
when the government is footing the bill.
Conclusion
When people develop relationships with their physi-
cians and pharmacists, they are entitled to the assur-
ance that information about their medical condition
will be used for their benefit and not to place their
health at risk or to increase their health care costs. In
the case of drug detailing and data mining, legislative
regulation is needed to provide that assurance.
While an extended and stringently applied com-
mercial speech doctrine could block government regu-
lation, such an approach would not be justified by first
amendment principle and should not be employed
to strike down statutes that prevent drug companies
from using physician-identifiable prescription drug
records to fashion their promotional activities.
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